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dWomen and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy:
Growth Helps, Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
Zafiris Tzannatos
ABSTRACT
The paper examines the  level and  changes in  female and male participation  rates,
employment  segregation  and female  relative  to male wages  across  the world economy. It
finds sufficient  evidence  to support  the view that labor  markets  in developing  countries  are
transformed  relatively  quickly  in the sense  that gender  differentials  in employment  and pay
are narrowing  much faster than they did in industrialized  countries. However,  the paper
evaluates  the inefficiencies  arising  from persisting  gender  differentials  in the labor market
and finds them to be potentially  significant. The estimates  also indicate  that the resulting
deadweight  losses are borne  primarily  by women  while  men  gain  mainly  in relative  terms --
there are no real winners from discrimination. The paper  concludes  that growth  benefits
women  at large,  inequalities  can have significantly  adverse  effects  on welfare,  and market-
based development  alone can be a weak instrument  for reducing  inequality  between  the
sexes. To break the vicious  circle of women's  low initial  human capital  endowments  and
inferior  labor market outcomes  compared  to men's, the paper proposes greater  access of
girls to education  and of women  to training,  enforceable  equal pay and equal employment
opportunities  legislation,  a taxation and benefits structure  that treats reproduction  as an
economic  activity  and women  as equal partners  within  households,  and a better  accounting
of women's  work  to include  invisible  production.
The author  would  like  to thank Lourdes  Beneria,  Mayra  Buvinic,  Diana  Elson,  Nancy  Folbre,  Brigida  Garcia,
Martha  Chen, Rekha Mehra,  Jill Merrick,  Heidi Worley and the participants  of conferences  organized  by
International  Center for  Research on  Women, Harvard Institute  for  Intemational  Development,  and
International  Association  of Feminist  Economists  for  helpful  comments  and suggestions  on earlier  versions  of
this paper. The findings,  interpretations  and conclusions  expressed  in this paper are entirely  those of the
author  and  should  not be attributed  in any manner  to the aforementioned  individuals  or the World  Bank,  to its
affiliated  organizations,  or to the members  of its Board  of Executive  Directors  or the countries  they  represent.II. INTRODUCTION
Today nearly 50 percent of women around the world are in the labor force, and women constitute
approximately  one-third  of all workers. Most  of the work performned  by females  is not paid following  the
traditional division  of labor within the household  or the nature of employment  in family farms.  Even
when it attracts  pay, women's work is valued less than men's.  Typically  women's earnings  average
around two-thirds  of men's.  Overall,  no more  than one-fifth  of the world's  wages accrue to women  partly
because women  are usually  engaged  in low-paying  jobs.  Even in these  jobs, women are usually  paid less
than men  doing  comparable  work.
Measuring the extent of these gender differences  in the labor market and their change over time can
provide useful  information  on how human resources are used and how efficiency  can increase,  poverty
can be reduced  and welfare  (of women  and men) increase. The objective  of this paper is to address  these
two issues.  The paper examines first the level and changes in female and male participation  rates,
employment  segregation  and female relative to male wages across the world economy and, second,
identifies  emerging  policy  issues.
At  the empirical level, the paper finds enough evidence to support the view that labor markets in
developing countries are  transformed relatively quickly in  the sense that  gender differentials in
employment  and pay are narrowing  much faster  than they did in industrialized  countries. Let us look at
an  example of the speed at which women's labor market characteristics  changed in  industrialized
countries. In Britain,  the first country  where  feudalism  started  being phased  out more than two centuries
ago,  the first censuses of  the mid-19th century showed that nearly 30 percent of  women were
"economically  active". This was the same  figure  as in the 1951  census  with surprisingly  little inter-censal
variation but, in only thirty years after 1950, the labor force participation  rate of British women  nearly
doubled.  In terms of employment  type, the biggest  employer  of women  was domestic service  until the
inter-war  years. Then  domestic  service  was replaced  by unskilled/junior  occupations  but, today,  the share
of women  in other  occupational  groups  has increased  significantly  especially  in managerial  jobs and in the
professions. Or, consider  earnings:  the first British  survey on wages  (1886),  the sporadic  enumerations  in
the first half of the 20th century and the post-war annual surveys show that women's pay remained
remarkably  stable  at around two-thirds  of male pay till 1970. Then, female  earnings increased  to three-
quarters of men's earnings  in a period of less than 10 years.  The British  experience  can be generalized
for other industrialized  countries. Compared  to this century-long  scenario  for industrialized  countries,  the
evidence in this paper suggests  that in many developing  countries significant  changes have taken place
within the last  few decades.
From a policy  perspective,  the analysis  of the evidence  suggests  that there is significant  scope for further
improvement  in women's  labor market outcomes  in developing  countries. These, if achieved,  can lead to
output gains and a reduction  in poverty in general and an improvement  in women's welfare  in particular.
The reasons  for gender differences  in the labor market and the paper's estimates  of the potential  welfare
gains associated  with the elimination  of these  differences  leads to the conclusion  is that inequalities  hurt and
public policy  matters. The paper suggests  a series  of policies  that can  be useful in this respect.
The next four sections  are empirical  and present  an aggregate  view of participation  rates in the labor force
(Section II), exarnine  employment  segregation  and female earnings  (Sections  III and IV), and answer thequestion  "what if there were no gender differences  in the labor market?"  (Section  V).  The implications  of
the empirical  findings  are  discussed  next (Section  VI) and a review  of emerging  policies last (Section  VII).
II. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES
As a general rule most men are in the labor force  during  prime age.  This results in high male participation
rates  with little variance  across  countries  and world  regions. By comparison,  female participation  rates are
diverse  both across countries  and also over time (Table  1).
Over time male participation  rates have shown some tendency to decline  mainly because of increasing
education  enrollments  among  the young and the availability  of pensions  for older workers. In contrast,  the
female  participation  rate tends to increase over time.  On a global basis  during the last three-four  decades,
the working  age population  and the male labor force  increased  by nearly  two percent per annum  (Table  2).
The female  labor force  increased  by nearly twice  as much (3.5 percent  per annum). Today, nearly half  of
women  aged 20-59 are in the labor force compared  to only one-third  in the 1950s.  The gender gap in
participation  narrowed  significantly.
Some  of the increase in female  participation  rates over time may be in part a statistical artifact,  that is, the
result of changing definitions  of work.  For example, in Angola, Mozambique  and Guinea-Bissau  the
participation  rates were surprisingly  low in the 1960s  (7, 7 and 1 percent respectively)  compared much
higher rates in other parts of Africa (eg 67 percent in Botswana, 73 percent in Zaire and 81 percent in
Dahomey; Nyberg,  1993).  The initially low female participation  rate  was the  result of  statistical
conventions  applied  under Portuguese  rule that largely  excluded  unpaid  and family work (Durand, 1975)  as
was also the "growth"  that followed  independence  (for example, the "data" show that in Mozambique  the
growth  rate in female  participation  was nearly 10  percent  per annum  between  the 1960  and the 1980s).
Also,  according  to the Dominican  census  of 1981  rural  female  labor force  participation  was 21 percent but a
special  study conducted  three years later suggested  a figure of 84 percent.  The difference  was due to the
exclusion  from the census  estimates  of activities  such as garden  cultivation  and animal  care (Pou, 1987). In
India,  narrow and broad definitions  of what constitute  work result in estimates  of participation  rates of 13
percent  and 88 percent respectively  (ILO, 1994:  Michel  Fromont:  World of Work: Fighting  for Equality  on
All Fronts).  According  to the Turkish census of 1980 there were 40,000 carpet weavers but estimates
based on annual carpet production  and number  of looms in operation  bring the figure of carpet weavers  to
around  half a million  most  of them  women (Berik,  1987).
2Table 1
Population,  Labor  Force and  Participation  Rates  for World  Regions
Population  Labor Force ( Age 20-59)  Participation Rates
Regions  (Age 20-59)
N
Earliest  Latest  Farliest Census  Latest Census  Earliest Census  Latest Census
Census  Census
(,000)  (,000)
Male (,000)  Female (,000)  Male (,000)  Female (,000)  Male  Female  Male  Female
East & Southern Afiica  8  14,724  22,145  7,015  2,002  9,702  4,812  92.3  35.3  89.7  44.8
West Africa  6  8,199  10,370  3,786  2,175  4,765  2,997  91.3  60.7  89.7  57.1
East Asia & Pacific  20  128,837  276,355  58,504  27,799  126,316  74,960  92.6  35.4  88.9  50.9
South  Asia  4  262,789  341,669  125,306  54,692  166,793  54,273  94.4  39.0  91.3  29.2
East. & Central Europe  9  186,658  245,462  75,978  67,036  109,888  99,993  93.5  61.9  90.4  76.0
Rest of Europe  26  176,958  219,164  80,399  35,612  99,551  59,960  95.0  36.6  90.4  53.5
Middle East  8  16,050  32,697  7,764  869  15,421  2,155  93.3  11.7  91.5  22.8
North Africa  5  22,217  41,883  10,293  1,630  19,217  2,789  92.5  N.A.  91.1  14.1
Americas  38  171,110  289,804  78,483  24,024  127,631  68,495  94.1  32.7  89.9  46.8
Total  124  987,545  1,479,548  447,529  215,838  679,283  370,434  93.7  35.9  f  90.1  47.9
Source:  ILO  data basis  using  the earliest  (1950s/1960s)  and latest (1980s/1990s)  information  for each  country.
3Table 2
Annual  Growth  (Percent)  in Labor  Force and Participation  Rates (Population  aged 20-59)
Between Earliest  (1950s/1960)  and Latest  Censuses  (1980s/1990s)
Population  Labor  Force  Participation  Rates
Male  Female  F/M  Male  Female  F/M
East & South Asia  2.57  2.50  3.98  1.45  -0.12  1.42  1.54
West Africa  2.06  2.02  2.18  0.16  -0.10  0.18  0.28
East Asia & Pacific  2.33  2.11  4.17  2.01  -0.16  1.73  1.88
South Asia  2.00  1.82  -0.37  -2.15  -0.13  -2.36  -2.23
East/Central Europe  0.71  0.80  1.20  0.40  -0.12  0.67  0.79
Rest of Europe  0.88  0.82  2.19  1.37  -0.20  1.44  1.64
Middle East  4.75  4.71  9.36  4.34  -0.08  4.29  4.37
North Africa  2.48  2.62  3.82  1.16  -0.03  1.49  1.53
Americas  2.08  1.90  3.84  1.91  -0.21  1.74  1.96
Total  1.99  1.88  3.51  1.59  -0.16  1.53  1.69
Source: ILO Data Base: Census Data
The sensitivity of what constitutes women's work,  in the sense that the dichotomy between work and non-
work is to a large extent  socially constructed, can be best seen paradoxically with reference to Sweden
where "today equality between women and men is the norm" (Nyberg, 1993).  Sweden provides a striking
example with respect to  the  measurement of  female work  that ran  well  into the  1960s. As Table  3
indicates, farm-wives' participation was initially excluded from the measurement of the labor force (only
751 such women were included in the statistics against nearly a quarter-of-a-million married male farmers
in 1930).  Apart from the perception that women's  work was seen as an undesirable family necessity and
that  the husband should  be  able to  support  a  family,  the  loose labor  market  conditions at  the  time
aggravated women's prospects  in the labor  market:  during the depression in the  1930s the parliament
debated laws to restrict  women's  right to work  (Lofstrom,  1981).  The situation continued to be  very
much the same till the end of World War II when there were again as many married male farmers as in
1930 but very few women.  In practice, nearly  zero percent of male farmers  lived with a wife  who
worked.
The situation changed somewhat in the censuses of the 1950 and in 1960.  In the earlier date women's work
in  agricultural households  counted  only  if  the  work  was  the responsibility  of  another member  of the
household (this referred  in  effect to grown-up  daughters or  domestic workers).  In  1960 the definition
expanded to include those who spent half of the normal working time on work.  The increase in the share of
male farmers with working wives was significant (it more than doubled, from 3 percent to 8 percent) but still
4defied  the emerging  definitions  of work. A special investigation  was called and the 1965  census  expanded
the definition  of work to include agricultural  activities  (such  as caring of animals, milking  and so on).  The
"increase"  in the number of working  women was dramatic,  from 8 percent to 52 percent. Today (1992)
information  from labor surveys  shows  that 84 percent  of women  with children  under the age of 7 years are in
the labor force. The  figure for men, also with  under age children,  is 95 percent.
Table 3
Working  Farmers  in Sweden,  Various  Censuses
1930  1945  1950  1960  1965
Female  751  151  5217  10387  58283
Male  221777  212594  195764  135263  104823
% of farmers with working wives  0  0  3  8  56
Source:  Adapted  from Nyberg  (1989)
Sources:  Lofstrom,  1981; Nyberg, 1993.
Setting aside statistical effects, significant  variation in the female participation  rates arises from the
interplay  of demographic  and social  factors  and women's family  responsibilities.  This is the reason why
conventional  econometric  analysis  often  fails  to explain  much  of the cross-country  variation  in the level of
female  participation  rates although  it may well include  a priori sensible  determinants  of participation  such
as education,  per capita  GDP, sectoral  composition  of output  and so on (Behrman  and Zhang, 1994). To
the extent that non-economic  determinants  are excluded from the analysis,  a lot of the variation  remains
unexplained. The  powerful effects  of non-economic  factors  can  be seen from the fact that the single  most
significant  predictor of female labor force participation  across  countries  is religion: religion  alone can
explain 35 percent of the cross-country  variation  in female  participation  rates over time (Psacharopoulos
and Tzannatos,  199  1, Table A-  1).
For these  reasons,  women's age-participation  profiles  follow  different  patterns (Figure  1). In broad terms,
these  patterns  can be grouped into three. The first one is relatively  flat across  age.  This  can be associated
with high or  low participation.  Countries with relatively high female participation  rates are the
Philippines,  Thailand,  Malaysia, Indonesia  and many African  countries  where the engagement  of women
in agriculture,  domestic  services,  petty  trade and handicrafts  places  relatively  little  pressure  on child care
and can be reconciled with other domestic activities.  On the other hand,  countries were female
participation  is universally  low are Nepal,  Bangladesh,  Sri Lanka, India  and Pakistan  where attitudes  are
not conducive  to women  working outside  the family  (Lim, 1993).
The second type of age-participation  profile is single-peaked. The peak occurs at a relative  young age
usually  before family  formation  and suggests  that women, once married, drop out of the labor force and
do not return even after children start  attending  school  and the need for childcare  becomes  somewhat  less
pressing.  It is still found even in some advanced  countries,  such as Ireland, and also in Singapore  and
Hong Kong  where  respectively  Catholicism  and Chinese-Confucianism  beliefs  support  the view  that the
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6prime responsibility  of married women is within  the family (Horton, 1994). This is also the pattern in
many Catholic  Latin  American  countries.
The third type of age-participation  profile  is the double-peaked.  The first peak  occurs prior to marriage.
Upon marriage  and childbearing  women  drop out of the labor force  but return  are children grow  older.
Korea and Japan  fit this pattern as well as rural Malaysia.
Despite  the effects  of demographic  and cultural  effects  on the female  participation  rates over time, economic
effects are becoming  more significant  over time.  Initially, female  participation  rates may decline  due to
declining  employment  opportunities,  existence  of non-trivial  adjustment  costs  and income  effects. Declining
employment  opportunities  arise from the movement  of the locus of production  away from the household,
agriculture/family  farm  and small  business  (such  as handicrafts)  to the wider  market. Adjustment  costs arise
from the need to learn a new trade or to emigrate. And as incomes  increase  with growth, there is less
pressure for women  to contribute to family  monetary  incomes.  The female  participation  rates can later
recover when the proportional  contribution  of additional  income to family welfare declines as GDP per
capita increases. This weakens the negative  income effect.  Female participation  can increase  due to a
positive substitution  effect when female wages  start rising (Mincer, 1964; Ashenfelter  and Layard, 1984;
Goldin, 1990).  This stylized exposition  describes  much of the process underlying changes  in female
participation  rates  over periods of growth.
This broad review  of participation  has many  implications  that are pursued  in the next sections  but, for the
time being, let us conclude  this section  iterating  that female  participation  rates  in developing  countries  are
rising relatively  fast, and this is only in part due to a better statistical  practices  for measuring  women's
work.
III. EMPLOYMENT  SEGREGATION
When women are in the labor force, they usually  perform different  tasks and work in different  sectors
than men.  The conditions  of their employment  are on average inferior to those faced by men and are
often "atypical"  (i.e., part-time, temporary, or casual work, work in the home and subcontracting).  In
terms of occupations,  for example, nearly two-thirds  of women in manufacturing  are categorized  as
laborers, operators  and production workers  while only a few can be found in the administrative  and
managerial positions  predominantly  held by men.  Women workers are usually employed  in a limited
number of industrial  sectors: more than two-thirds  of the global labor force in garment production  is
female-accounting  for almost one-fifth  of the total female  labor force in manufacturing. With respect  to
employment  status,  the majority  of family  workers  are female  and, it may  be added, often  unpaid.
These  patterns  suggest  that women and men in the labor  market are employed  in different sectors  and that,
even  when they  are in the same sector, they  carry out different  tasks  at different  levels of responsibilities.
This  phenomenon,  sex  segregation  in  the  labor  force,  makes female  and  male  workers  work  in
"compartmentalized"  activities that usually  lead to different rewards and different career opportunities
even  though workers  may have comparable  labor  market  attributes.
7From the perspective of this paper, the interest is in changes in segregation over time.  Sex segregation is
difficult to measure, and existing statistics do not represent adequately the complex economic and social
processes that generate it. However, a commonly used statistic is the Duncan index (Duncan and Duncan,
1955), an index of employment dissimilarity between any two groups of workers.  In the case of women
and men the Duncan index, D, takes the form
I  N
D  =  2  E  I  -i
2  j=,
where i  =  1,2,...,N  is the total number of sectors of interest (for example, industries or occupations), f
and mi are the sectoral employment ratios of women and men  to their respective labor force, and the
summation refers to the absolute differences between women's and men's ratios within each sector.  The
minimum  value  of  the  index is zero;  it  occurs  when women  and  men  have  identical employment
distributions  across  sectors,  i.e.,  when  the  percentage of  women in  each  sector  is the  same as  the
percentage of women in total employment.  The maximum value, unity, occurs when there  is complete
dissimilarity (no women and men work in the same sector).
A  worldwide  examination of data shows that for  all  types of workers  across the  world  employment
dissimilarity by industry as measured by the Duncan index declined on average from 0.35 to 0.31 in the
period between  the  1950s/1960s and  the  1980s/1990s (Table 4).  But employment dissirnilarity among
employees only, albeit higher initialiy (0.40 in the earlier period),  declined more quickly and currently
stands at the same level as the dissimilarity for the whole labor force (0.31).
Similarly, occupational dissimilarity among all workers registered practically no change between the two
periods under  consideration (0.39 and 0.38), but the dissimilarity among employees declined from 0.44 to
0.40 (Table 5).  One explanation for the more rapid decline in segregation among  employees compared
with all  workers may be that market forces are less discriminating against women than  non-economic
factors: It may be more difficult for women to break sex stereotypes in self-employment and family work
that is undertaken more often at the village or community level.
Taking  "Rest  of  Europe"  as  representative of  the  group  of  industrialized countries,  the  decline  in
segregation has generally been much slower than in the developing regions in general.  As in the case of
participation, changes in developing countries are taking place at a relatively fast rate.
8Table 4
Employment Dissimilarity (Duncan Index) by Industry
(Unweighted  Regional Averages; N  no. of countries)
ALL WORKERSl
N  Early  Late Duncan
Duncan
Africa (excl. North Africa)  4  0.2772  0.2509
East Asia & Pacific  9  0.2723  0.2182
South Asia  3  0.1487  0.2041
Eastern & Central Europe  5  0.2105  0.2604
Rest of Europe  15  0.3448  0.3028
Middle East and North Africa  6  0.3761  0.3995
Americas  19  0.4519  0.3656
Total  61  0.3458  0.3058
EMPLOYEES ONLY 2
N  Early Duncan  Late Duncan
Africa (excl. North Africa)  4  0.4559  0.3003
East Asia & Pacific  9  0.3368  0.2332
South Asia  3  0.2827  0.2677
Eastern & Central Europe  5  0.3234  0.3141
Rest of Europe  15  0.3711  0.3216
Middle East and North Africa  6  0.4250  0.3781
Americas  19  0.4602  0.3258
Total  61  0.3948  0.3097
I  Wage employment, self-employment  and family work
2  Wage employment only
3  The calculation of the index is based on 7 industries: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction,  utilities,
transport and services as tabulated by ILO.
Sources:  ILO  (International Labour  Organization) (1990) Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics.- Retrospective
Edition on Population Censuses 1945-1989. Geneva: ILO.
9Table 5
Employment  Dissimilarity  (Duncan  Statistic)  by Occupation
(Unweighted  Regional  Averages;  N  no. of countries)
ALL WORKERS
N  Early  Late Duncan
Duncan
West Africa  2  0.2258  0.2301
East Asia & Pacific  9  0.3169  0.3190
South Asia  2  0.2011  0.1958
Eastern & Central Europe  1  0.2655  0.2623
Rest of Europe  13  0.4068  0.4022
Middle East and North Africa  5  0.3566  0.4623
Americas  11  0.5191  0.4469
Total  45  0.3860  0.3804
EMPLOYEES ONLY 2
N  Early  Late Duncan
Duncan
West Africa  2  0.3807  0.2909
East Asia & Pacific  9  0.4052  0.3257
South Asia  2  0.4783  0.3528
Eastern & Central Europe  1  0.2548  0.2714
Rest of Europe  13  0.4254  0.4165
Middle East and North Africa  5  0.4072  0.4926
Americas  11  0.5442  0.4553
Total  45  0.4421  0.4030
1  Wage employment, self-employment  and family work
2  Wage employment only
3  The calculation of  the index is based on 7 occupations: professional, administrative, clerical, sales, services,
farmer and production.
Sources: See sources to Table 4
10IV. FEMALE LABOR EARNINGS
Though there are many developing countries for which information on female relative earnings exists, in
only a few does information extend to more than one points in time.  This limits considerably the number
of  countries  for  which  changes  in  relative  earnings  can  be  observed.  Countries  for  which  such
information exists are presented Table 6.
Table 6
Female Relative  Earnings in Selected Countries and Their Change Over Time
(percent)
Country  Year  FIM wage  Year  F/M wage  Annual Change
Cote d' Ivoire  1985  75.7  1988  81.4  2.4
Brazil  1981  50.2  1990  53.6  0.7
Colombia  1984  67.2  1990  70.2  0.7
Philippines  1978  70.9  1988  80.0  1.2
Thailand  1980  73.5  1990  79.8  0.8
Indonesia  1986  55.6  1992  60.0  1.3
Chile  1980  68.0  1987  71.0  0.6
Costa Rica  1980  90.0  1989  97.0  0.8
Honduras  1986  65.0  1990  68.0  1.1
Malaysia  1973  56.8  1984  69.3  1.8
Korea  1984  41.9  1988  51.0  5.0
Venezuela  1981  87.0  1990  93.0  0.7
Note:  Relative earnings are not usually comparable  between countries
Sources:  Tzannatos (1995)
There is significant cross-country variation in the level of female relative earnings.  This can be explained
by  different definitions, survey designs, sectoral composition of employment, whether they refer to the
urban sector, non-agricultural employment or the whole economy and so on.  Explaining these differences
is not, however, the objective of this paper.  For  current purposes the table shows than female relative
earnings seem to be increasing over time, at least they did so during the period under  consideration.
Though it cannot be  said whether female relative  earnings will continue to  rise,  the  current trend  is
positive and seems to suggest an average increase of 1 percent per annum.
11Understanding the reasons why female earnings are increasing over time is important.  For example, they
may rise because the number  of women workers in high-pay jobs  has increased, or because the gender
pay gap within jobs has declined, or because men's wages are decreasing.  This can be examined formally
R  _Wf bWi_f  w{  w>
-m  W'1'  W  MW  (2)
through the equation
where R is the economywide ratio of average female wage (Wf) to the average male wage (Wm), Ij is the
ratio of women's  employment in sector i to total female employment, and Wfi and Wmi are respectively
female and male wages in sector i.  The level of the economywide female relative wage does, therefore,
depend  on  the  employment  distribution  of  women workers  (Cj), the  relative  wages  within sectors
(Wfi/Wmo) and the level of male wages across sectors (as indicated by the ratio Wmin/W).
The change in economywide  female relative earnings would be approximately equal to the sum of changes
in the  three  right-hand side  factors  in equation 2.  Thus  the  economywide change in  female relative
earnings can be "decomposed" into three effects:
an employment effect, that  shows the importance of changes in the sectoral employment of women
workers;
a female wage effect, that reflects changes in gender pay differentials within sectors (an "equal pay-
type" effect), and
a structural wage effect, that reveals the effect of changes in male earnings.
This  decomposition  can  apply  to  only  six  of  the  countries  shown  in  Table  6  due  to  paucity  of
disaggregated data.  The results of the decomposition  based on industrial data are shown in Table 7.  As a
general rule,  the change in female  relative wages has been primarily  due to the "equal pay type" effect
(Column 2).  In all cases (except Thailand) this effect is the single most important one and always positive
(in the case of Thailand, it is likely that some of the large employment effect is due to statistical reasons as
the Labor Force Surveys are often affected by significant  changes in the sample size).
The relative  employment effect (Column 1) and wage structure effect (Column 3) were opposite in sign
with the  employment effect  being  slightly greater  than the  wage  structure effect  (the exceptions are
Indonesia  and  Cote  d'  Ivoire).  This  fact  that  can be  taken  to  suggest that,  indeed,  when  female
employment increases, this can have a negative effect on male wages.  This is what is largely indicated by
the neologisms "feminization", "casualization", "informalization" and  "flexibilization".  However, at
face value,  the results suggest that  the adverse reaction of male wages is generally neither sizable nor
uniform.
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Percentage  Points  Increase  in Female  Relative  Earnings  due  to Changes  in
Country  Female  Female  wages  Wage Structure
Employment
(1)  (2)  (3)
Cote d' Ivoire (4)  -0.1  7.0  -0.5
Brazil (5)  0.4  5.2  -2.2
Colombia  (9)  0.2  3.1  -0.1
Philippines (9)  -0.5  10.2  0.2
Thailand (8)  13.5  0.0  -8.1
Indonesia (4)  1.5  1.9  0.9
Note: Number  of industries in parentheses;
Sources: Tzannatos (1995).
The last point  is revisited in the next section, that is, although in most cases changes in female sectoral
employment were accompanied by opposite changes in male sectoral wages, the changes in male wages
were in general  small indicating that women's  gains do not result in a proportionate decline in men's
wages.  For the time being, one can conclude that female relative earnings increased because of an equal-
pay type effect (women are now paid more like men than before).
V. GENDER DIFFERENCES AND EFFICIENCY LOSSES
If gender differences in the labor market are solely the result of discrimination and women are excluded,
for example, from some occupations  and crowded in others, then, by virtue of the distorted relative labor
supply across  occupations, pay would be  higher in male-dominated occupations and  lower  in female-
dominated  occupations  than  it  would  be  under  nondiscriminatory  conditions.  Another  effect  of
segregation would be a welfare loss (reduction in total output) arising from the misallocation of the labor
force: in plain terms, competent  female workers are excluded from the most productive activities they can
do which are then undertaken by less able (compared to women) men.
A method to evaluate the wage and output effects under conditions of discrimination has been proposed in
the context of racial segregation (Bergmann, 1971).  This method  can be extended to apply in a gender
context (Tzannatos,  1988) on the assumption that women and men have the same supply characteristics
(human capital and preferences).  The exercise proceeds in two steps.  First,  it estimates output under
current conditions, that is, when there are occupational and wage differences within industries.  Second, it
re-estimates output assuming that these inter-industry differentials are eliminated. The difference between
these two estimates of output provide an indication of the potential (maximum) welfare gains that could be
achieved, if women had the same characteristics and preferences as men,  and they are treated equally in
the labor market and family.
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Effects of Elimination of Occupational Segregation








Female wages  Male wages  Output
(GDP)
Argentina  1987  38  -9  4  25
Bolivia  1989  50  -9  6  28
Brazil  1980  96  -8  9  23
Chile  1987  41  -6  3  18
Colombia  1988  46  -8  5  20
Costa Rica  1989  35  -6  3  18
Ecuador  1966  59  -13  9  37
Guatemala  1989  25  -6  2  14
Jamaica  1989  61  -8  8  28
Uruguay  1989  30  -8  3  16
Venezuela  1987  24  -6  2  12
Source: Adapted from Z. Tzannatos  (1991), "Potential Gains from the Elimination of Labor
Market Differentials" in Women's Employment and Pay in Latin America, Report to the Latin
American and Caribbean Technical Department.  Washington DC: The World Bank.
The results of this exercise are therefore indicative of what can happen in the long run when (1) women
and men are equally endowed with human  capital, (2) there is no  employer discrimination, (3)  family
constraints are no more binding upon women than men, and (4) the gender specific effects of social norms
and  other  institutional  factors  have  withered  away.  Though,  obviously,  subject  to  a  series  of
qualifications, the simulations suggest that women's  wages can increase  significantly at practically little
loss in male wages (Table 8, columns 1 and 2).  Part of the explanation rests on the fact that there can be
significant output  gains  (column 3).  In  other  words,  a  reduction  in  segregation  is  not  a  purely
redistributive issue; the  "size of the pie" increases with women claiming a bigger share.  In fact, given
14that the economy grows over time, men's wages need not decline in absolute terms--a point worth noting
because with zero-sum gains the losers (in this case men) may devise strategies for forestalling equality.
This phenomenon has been emphasized in political economy and is known as "the reversal rest" (those
losing from economic change can  bribe the  winners  and  forestall the  move toward  a  Pareto-efficient
outcome).  So, a reduction in equality can have beneficial effects on women and men.  However, a point
that need be mentioned is may take considerable time before equality is achieved: Column 4 indicates the
percentage of the labor force that would have to be reshuffled to achieve the gains estimated in the current
exercise.  The mere size of labor  reallocations (the shift of women to men's jobs and vice versa) is not
something that can be achieved in the short-run given that the main avenue for changes of existing labor
market patterns are through annual flows to the labor force,  and these are usually only a fraction of the
labor force stock.
In conclusion, gender  differences,  to the extent  that  they  are  the  result of discrimination, can incur
significant efficiency losses that hurt women and benefit  men only in relative (to women) terms.  The
economy suffers a deadweight loss that is primarily borne by women.
VI. QUALIFICATIONS
The previous sections examined the pattern and trends in participation rates, employment segregation and
relative wages and provided estimates of effects on  wages and welfare gains if gender differentials were
eliminated.  On the  basis of the  indicators used,  the  analysis in  this paper  suggests that  women in
developing countries seem to hold  well their position labor market, especially as employees.  In many
cases the risk of poverty and the well-being of a woman depends significantly on whether she has direct
access to income, not just access mediated through her  husband or other male family member(s).  Better
use of women's potential in the market results in greater  efficiency at the macro level.  At an individual
level,  women's  bargaining  power  in  the  household  increases  when  women's  work  is  directly
remunerated.  Children's welfare also increases: there  are substantial differences in how women and men
within the household spend their incomes, and children's  nutritional status tends to be more linked to the
mother's  earnings than the father's  (Kumar,  1978).  For  female headed households with no additional
adult support,  the link is even stronger.  Such households  often constitute a  sizable percentage of the
population, often as much as one-fifth percent of all households (Buvinic, Lycette and McGreevy, 1983;
Safilios-Rothchild  and Mahmnud, 1989).  Thus,  the importance of an improvement in women workers'
labor market outcomes cannot be underrated and, in fact, our efficiency gains estimates may be lower than
in practice  as they are  based only  on  individual workers  and labor  market changes,  and do  not take
household spillover effects into account.
However, the paper's  findings can be subject to the definitions used.  In addition, the findings should not
be  taken  to  imply  that all  gender  differences are  necessarily  harmful  or  that  equality  policies will
eliminated them completely.
Consider, for example, the fact that the degree of sex segregation as measured by  the Duncan index, has
been declining over time.  However, employment differences may arise in new forns  that the index fails to
capture.  The introduction of new technologies usually  changes not only gender employment pattenms  but
also social relations among the people.  The division of labor by sex may get reconstituted with shifts in
production methods and technology and can redistribute power, resources and authority in ways that keep
women  in  subordinate positions.  In  this  shift  a  new  division  of  labor  by  sex  may  become more
15disadvantageous  to women as, for example,  has been argued in the case of rural Java (Wahyana,  1994).
These changes  may not show up in numerical  measures  of segregation  that defeminize  female  jobs  (for
example, nurses, telephone operators, flight attendants) and feminize some formerly male jobs  (for
example, bank tellers, teachers).  New forms of segregation  can occur with women being predominantly
employed in part-time  work with high turnover rates, short job tenures,  the lowest incidence  of unsocial
hours and low trade  union membership. These forms of segregation  are typical of workers  with a weak
commitment  to employment  careers or strong commitment  to family responsibilities  that lie outside the
market, and such  workers  are usually  women.
Alternatively,  some  evidence  points  to the fact that an increase  in segregation  is not necessarily  synonymous
with poorer opportunities  or inferior labor market outcomes for women.  In Puerto Rico, segregation
patterns have been  found to be consistent  with median annual earnings  of women that are quite close to
those of men (Presser and Kishor, 1991).  An explanation for this is that women are offered more
opportunities  for upward  mobility  when  production  is organized  around strictly  segregated  occupations  than
when women and men work together. Under such an arrangement,  women  will be required to supervise
other women and get better jobs than they would otherwise  have, while in male occupations  some men
simply have to accept low status/pay  jobs.  On similar grounds, horizontal desegregation  does not
unambiguously  represent an  improvement  in the labor market position of women: the feminization  of
previously  male dominated  jobs can be associated with deteriorating  employment  conditions  due to the
increase  in total labor  supply that in turn  depresses  wages  for both women  and men in those  jobs. This may
also lead to an increase  in vertical segregation  if men move up to top positions. Also, the empirical  results
presented  in Section  IV suggest  that despite  increases  in segregation  during  the years under consideration  in
five of the countries  examined  (that is, except  Brazil),  women's earnings  still increased  relative  to men.
Similarly, the analysis  of increasing  relative earnings  showed that women are now paid more like men
than before (the "equal-pay  type effect  was dominant). However,  we do not know  whether  this is due to
declining  wage discrimination  or because  the educational  attainment  of women has increased. To answer
this question  requires  additional  research  (and richer data).
Finally, the paper did not examine  whether  changes in women wages and employment  have taken place
while their work in the invisible economy  has been constant or has not decrease to fully compensate  for
their greater participation  in the monetized  economy. In addition,  if the distributional  "rules"  for women's
and men's timne  allocations  and costs and benefits within the household  are not adjusting  fast enough, the
fruits from women's  work may translate  into increases  in other household  members' welfare  with little net
gain for them.  However, as fertility  declines and productivity  at home rises (assuming  an increase in
women's education  and improvements  in infrastructure),  the labor market changes  reported in this paper
may leave women  with net gains. In addition,  since  women who earn income  have greater control  on how
to  spend it  (though many working women still turn  their earnings to  their husbands), and  since
complementary  research  has shown that  gender differentials  in the wage  labor market tend to decline  faster
over time than those in the informal/invisible  economy, women in developing  countries  may not have to
wait for two centuries  before they achieve  a position comparable  to that of their counterparts  in today's
industrialized  economies. Of course,  even  such an achievement  may not necessarily  imply  equality.
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The discussion on  participation has many implications of which the  following  two stand out.  First,
measuring correctly women's  work is not only good statistics but good economics: in general, we  know
little about whether the increase in female participation in developing countries has come at the (invisible)
cost of longer work hours at home and inferior quality of child care.  The conceptual battle for  a better
accounting for women's  work has been largely won (Beneria, 1992) but the operationalization of these
concepts still requires more resources and emphasis to be paid on the collection of data that capture unpaid
work better and limit the influence cultural norms that restrict the admittance of the fact that a woman  is
working.
Second, women's longer attachment to the labor force (in the sense of rising participation rates) increases
their experience and skills and makes them "persistent" (compared to casual or secondary) workers.  This
increases the incentives for employers to offer training to female workers and  enhances women's  career
opportunities and results in greater earnings.  This in turn increases the incentives for families to invest in
girl's  education.  The role of education is important for  women to  be  able to take advantage of new
employment opportunities and increase their incomes.  In a cross-country context it was  estinated  that a
one-year increase in female education increases female participation by three  years (Psacharopoulos and
Tzannatos, 1991) and microeconomic evidence strongly confirms that the positive effect of education  on
the female participation in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
The cross-country evidence reviewed in this paper confirms that economic development contributes to a
reduction of employment segregation, a fact that is increasingly acknowledged  in the literature  (Glyn,
1992).  As in  the  case  of  labor  force participation,  education has  enabled  the  female  employment
distribution to become more equal with respect to the male employment distribution.  Gains in women's
education augment their productivity and enable them to compete more effectively with men in the  labor
market.  Higher levels of education are also associated with higher levels of labor force participation,
which  in  turn  provides  women  with  greater  work  experience  and  skills  and  reduces  statistical
discrimination as  employers'  expectations about  women's  longevity in  the  labor  force  become  more
optimistic.  In turn,  this justifies  more in-service training for  women.  For  developing countries  the
elimination of gender differences in education is, therefore, a priority policy area.
Additional measures  can be  desirable.  When sex  segregation reflects  the  interaction of constrained
choices of women resulting from  gender-biased demands for  child-care,  exclusion strategies  of  male
workers, discrimination  by employers, and legislation, it becomes a clear policy issue.  This is because it
entails both inequality in the treatment of women and men and inefficient processes in the labor market,
which subsequently result in the underutilization  of women's labor (inefficiency), lower wages for women
(inequality), lower  levels of output (welfare loss) and  social injustice (inequity).  Policies can  reduce
impedimnents  to women's employment and enable women to exercise their own choices on the same basis
as men.  When segregation is simply the result of a legal exclusion of women from certain activities (for
example, as a result of protective legislation), the abolition of such provisions  when they are no  longer
justified can be effective in reducing segregation.
In cases of employer discrimination, legislation that requires employers to treat women and men  equally
with respect to hiring, training, promotions decisions and other employment practices can be introduced.
Employment discrimination  that leads to segregation is still practiced in many countries and is not illegal.
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and men. In some countries  employers  make sterilization  certificates,  pregnancy  tests, marital status  and
other screening  practices  a condition  for employing  women  in production. In others discrimination  can
arise directly  or indirectly  from legal provisions  such as gender specific clauses  in family, inheritance,
taxation,  social insurance  and other  laws.  These practices  give rise to economy-wide  inefficiency  and a
feedback  effect that influences  worker and family expectations  at the micro level.  The economy  suffers
from static inefficiency  (lower levels  of current output)  as well as from dynamic  inefficiency  in the form
of underinvestment  in women's  human  capital and lower future  rates of growth. Removing  impediments
to women's  work is an increasingly  pressing issue:  as female  labor force participation  rates rise, a greater
proportion  of the labor  force is affected,  and efficiency  losses  from the underutilization  of women's labor
increase.
Public  policies targeting  the labor market can have an effect, but should not focus exclusively  on labor
legislation.  Discrimination  prior to entry in the labor market or within the family is an important
determinant  of gender  differences  in the labor market. There  is often an implicit  acceptance  and a de  jure
enforcement  that it  is women who bear  or  should bear the responsibility  of children.  Women's
employment  patterns are shaped by normns  or legislation  that evolve around the notion that women  can
work while  bringing  up their children. Public policy  can address  gender biases within the household  by
encouraging  men to share equally  with women the responsibility  for childrearing. Absent parents  should
be obliged  to pay child  support. Maternal  leave beyond  what is required for a woman to recuperate  after
she gives  birth has already  been replaced  by parental  leave open to both parents  in some countries. Such
legislation  needs to be supported  by changes in the tax system to ensure equal treatmnent  of individuals
within  the household. The marginal  tax rate on earnings  of additional  workers  in the household  should  be
low enough  to avoid  creating  a disincentive  to "secondary"  workers,  who are usually  women.
In short, public policy can affect women in many ways.  Family law can change  the responsibilities  or
choices  of married  women. Labor  law affects the labor  supply  of and labor demand  for women  and men.
Social insurance  and social assistance  can affect the family through the provision of benefits  and the
economy  through the way they are financed.  Labor  market interventions  are therefore only one policy
instrument  and their design  and effects  should be examined  together with other  social  policies. Below,  the
paper  discusses  in some  detail  a series  of interventions  and offers  subjective  evaluations  of them.
Benefits
Various  benefits (such as cash transfers, food benefits  and health care) have different effects on work,
marital  and reproductive  behavior  (Schultz, 1994). The distributional  effects of benefits are complex  as
are also the efficiency issues associated  with possible  disincentives  they create and the way they are
financed.
The effects of benefits  on work incentives  and the possibility  of creating segmented (protected  versus
unprotected)  labor market are particularly important  for women.  More women are than men are
employed  in the informal  sector  partly because it is easier for women to combine  family responsibilities
with employment. The informal  sector offers more choice in terms of when work would be performed
and how long it would  last. But many women engage  in informal  sector activities  because the expansion
of the modern  sector  has been slow  often due to distortionary  trade and labor policies. Growth in some
countries  has not been  sufficient  to absorb the rising  number  of women  workers  in wage employment.
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of the formal sector to generate additional jobs.  On the labor supply side, the evidence (predominantly
from developed countries) on the effects of various benefits  upon women's labor supply typically confirms
they are adverse.  But what is more interesting is the magnitude of these effects.  If the disincentives are
modest, then  benefits do not reduce  the work effort and the tax  base unduly while they  can provide
income security.
In the US the receipt of benefits (AFDC  -Aid to Families with Dependent Children) has  been found to
exercise a  moderately adverse labor  supply response from female  heads already in receipt  of benefits
(AFDC) but little change in market  work  in order to qualify for  welfare.  In fact, the  change in the
employment rates of female heads  since the late 1960s seems to have been negligible in comparison to
large changes in AFDC (Moffitt, 1992).  Schultz (1994) confirms this modest effect by estimating that the
reduction in the probability of a recipient to be a wage earner  is of the order three percent for a black
woman and  one percent for a white  women.  The effect of welfare programs on female  headship and
marriage have been mixed.  Female headship rose as benefits rose from the late 1960s to the early 1970s.
Then the two moved in opposite directions.  Studies undertaken  in the 1970s found weak relationship
between the two but subsequent research  found stronger and positive effects (for a review  see Moffitt,
1992).
Benefits are therefore an important policy instrumnent.  Their availability can reduce the pressure to pursue
social objectives via  the labor market  and affect  its allocative role.  For example,  when  benefits are
available,  the justification for  minimum  wages  becomes weaker.  So,  social  assistance  can play  a
beneficial  role  by  correcting  market  outcomes when  these  are  not in  line  with  social  objectives.
Alternatively, governments may introduce unintentionally  harmful effects through premature  increases in
labor protection  and  rises in  labor  costs that  inhibit growth and  reduce employment creation.  This
situation can arise when benefits are  employer financed and increase the cost of female employment or
when benefit levels are so high that reduce unduly the incentives  to work.
Pensions
Pensions represent an important portion of total worker compensation.  In aging societies and as divorce
rates rise  and  non-conventional households become more conmmon,  pension coverage and  the level of
benefits have serious implications for distribution and poverty, and the functioning  of the labor market.
Even in some developed countries, though poverty rates among the elderly are falling, this trend does not
seem to have benefited widows (Hurd and Wise, 1988; Burkhauser and Duncan, 1988).
Data and  analyses of pension effects  are lacking for women  in  developing countries.  But women's
difference labor force characteristics  have an effect on their old age security.  In developing countries
very few women workers are members  of a pensions plan.  Practically all these workers are in the formal
sector and most in government jobs.  Even in developed countries, the percentage of workers enrolled in a
pension plan is smaller for women than men (eg 45 percent of female employees and 55 percent of male
employees in the US are enrolled  in private pension plan).  Among the already aged, the percentage of
retirees receiving a private pension is 66 percent for men but only 24 percent.  Two-thirds of the gender
gap in pension coverage in the US can be accounted for by  differences in labor market histories.  The
increasing attachment of women in the labor market in the form  of longer tenure, full-time status and
increasing earnings is contributing to the decline in the pension coverage gap (Even and Macpherson,
191994). Policies  should  ensure equal  treatment  of women  and men with  respect  to old age security  (such  as
in terms of scope,  coverage, eligibility,  contributions  and benefits  of pensions).
Married  Workers
In some countries,  married women are by law or strong social customs  prevented  from work.  This was
also true in Japan and Korea until recently  (late 1970s-early  1980s)  where women  had to leave their  jobs
upon marriage. In Korea, though it is no longer  permissible  to discriminate  against  married women  in
promotion  and dismissal,  discrimination  in hiring  is still not punishable  by law. And  in Japan employment
remains sex stereotyped. In Indonesia,  discrimination  against  married women in hiring is still permitted
while in family law the husband is recognized  as the head of the household. Such provisions  result in
women workers  being initially channeled  into dead-end  jobs, being  paid low wages  and being  the first to
be laid off. This reduces  women's incentive  to stay in the labor force  and the incentive  to invest  in human
capital.  The treatment of  the family and married workers can therefore reinforce the traditional
specialization  of labor  within  the household  and statistical  discrimination.
In general, countries  are removing discriminatory  provisions  from regulations. More recently,  the issue
of  discrimination  has been explicitly incorporated  in  the national statutes or  by ratifying the ILO
Convention 156 on workers with family responsibilities. In the Philippines  unequal provisions  of the
family law have been removed following  the 1987 constitution  that explicitly  calls for equality  between
women  and men.
But gender biases still exist in various forms.  Often the treatment  of the family as a tax unit creates
disincentives  for women to work.  Joint taxation  tends to keep women at home more than separate
taxation  because  of the higher marginal  taxes  that  the earnings  of the secondary  worker (usually,  the wife)
attract. Separate  taxation  increases  women's  incentives  to work while  it results  in greater participation  by
the husband  in domestic  activities (Cigno, 1994).
In other cases divorce laws do not oblige  fathers  to support their children  or women lack the financial
ability to get access to courts.  When legal provisions  enable a more equal sharing of child care and
responsibilities  among parents, women's constraints  on work are eased and poverty among mothers
declines. For example,  in Sweden  authorities  make serious  attempts  to identify  the fathers  and make  them
share the financial  cost of child rearing - this increases also the price of children to men and reduces
fertility  with resulting  beneficial  effects  on women  welfare  and work (Gustaffson,  1994).
Family responsibilities  should not be solely  identified  with child care.  Even in developed  countries,  the
demographic  trends and the higher shares of the aging population,  the ill and the disable create a
dependency  that falls disproportionately  on women.  The carefully  designed  and timely introduction  of
social  services  covering  these areas can ease  time constraints  on women  and increase  social  welfare.
Maternity  Legislation
Maternity  leave refers to leave that deals  with the physical demands  placed  on pregnant women  and new
mothers.  But there is wild variation in the provisions  of maternity  legislation  even among developed
countries -- for example, legislation  grants 15 weeks leave in Canada  but only six in the United  States
(Trzcinski  and Alpert, 1994). The provisions  of maternity  legislation  also differ  to the extent that there is
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the  labor market varies according to prevailing family  arrangements and  generalizations about what is
feasible, effective  and sustainable varies across countries and time.
In the Philippines and Thailand the extended family has enabled women  to continue work after family
formation by providing day  care.  In some other  South Asian countries  and many African economies
children do not constitute a major barrier to female labor force participation and do not seem to reduce the
potential  duration  of  working  life  of  women  relative  to  men.  However,  taking  into  account  the
unrecorded  effort  in  home  production,  childbearing  and  rearing places  an  additional constraint  on
women's employment  choices or on girls to seek education.
Maternity benefits are a relatively recent phenomenon even in industrialized countries and as a general
rule parental benefits started being introduced only  in the  1980s.  Still, concerns about cost effects of
maternity programs upon employers typically restrict  the scope and coverage  of maternity legislation.
Legislation on maternity usually exempts firms below certain size (such as fewer than 50 employees) and
requires that employees must have worked with the specific employer for some period of tirne (such as at
least 12 months).
Legislation on maternity creates costs to  employers in  two ways.  First,  by  the mere  interruption of
women's  employment during leave.  These are non-monetary costs due to protection from dismissal and
the need for fnding a substitute during the beneficiary worker's leave.
Second, by the monetary benefits that the employer may have to pay the worker.  The obligations arising
from  maternity protection and  family responsibilities tend to  increase  the  costs  of employing women
workers and this is overcome by lowering women's  wages or limiting recruitment to childless women --
medical certificates that guarantee sterility are utilized in some developing countries.
The level of maternity benefits and their finance vary  significantly  by country.  In Germany the maternity
grant is paid by the state health insurance and the paternal grant through federal funds.  The employer has
to cover the difference between the maternity grant  (25 DM/day) and the benefit which amounts to the
average wage of the last 13 weeks.  In Japan, part of maternity benefits is paid for by the Social Security
system.  In Thailand the  costs  are shared  equally between employers  and  the  social security system
whereas  in most of the other Asian countries the  costs fall mainly on  employers.  And Korea is now
considering shifting  part of the cost to the social security system.
Maternity  leave and  maternity benefits are often  seen in the context of  protecting women as women,
women as mothers, women as workers and ultimately children.  To the  extent that benefits can accrue
only to mothers, the taking-up of these benefits affect the work behavior of women but not of men and
inequities both in the labor market and in the family perpetuate.  In this respect,  legal provisions should be
broadened  to  include "parental"  leave and benefits,  that  is, to  eventually  enable men  and women to
become more equal partners in the labor market and at home.
Maternity benefits should become part of family and  employment policies that reinforce each other.
Legislation on maternity and child care that puts the  burden on  employers without compensation from
national  insurance increases  the  cost of  female  labor  and  reduces the  employment opportunities for
women.  This is the  reason  why  in many cases  such legislation is poorly  enforced or by-passed by
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rather than through the employer, can reduce labor costs from employing women  and can also reach
workers  in the informal  sector  and the  population  at large.
Protective  Legislation
There are two types of legislation  affecting  women's work.  Protective legislation  (such as maternity,
night  and hazardous  work)  and equity-promoting  legislation  (such  as the requirement  that women  and men
are paid equal  wages or are afforded  equal opportunities  in hiring, training and promotion  for the same
qualifications  as men or in the same/like  sectors of employment).
Protective  legislation  tends to predate equity promoting  legislation. In its early applications  (generally
before the 1960s)  it was based on the notion that female  workers are young and vulnerable  laborers.
Protective  legislation  was seen as more valuable to women than was legislation  to ensure equality  given
the exploitative  conditions  women  (and children)  faced during  the early stages  of industrialization  (Goldin,
1990).
Occupational  and environmental  hazards  can have different  effects on women than  men.  The mere fact
that women  tend to be employed  in low-wage  positions  in the unregulated sector  such as food vendors,
petty traders, domestic workers or agricultural laborers can expose them to pesticides  and other toxic
chemicals,  extreme temperatures,  excessive noise or require undue physical effort.  The undesirable
effects of unsafe working conditions  intensify in the case of pregnant women.  Today, a series of
international  conventions  and national  legislation  address specifically  women's issues  in the labor market
and aim at protecting female workers in terms of health and safety, conditions  of work and special
requirements  arising from women's  reproductive  functions. These regulations  include  protection  against
chemical and physical standards, night work,  underground employment, hours of work, maternity
protection  and so on.
Protective  legislation  can lead to statistical  discrimination  against  those groups that are deemed  to benefit.
Such regulation  usually  helps those already at work but hampers  the prospects  of those searching  for a
job in the protected  sector  or creates  a wedge between  the covered  and uncovered  sectors. In fact, certain
regulations are considered as  incompatible  with equality demands (Mason, 1988).  For  example,
restrictions  on overtime  or night  work or exclusions  from certain occupations  can unduly  reduce  women's
ability  to compete  effectively  with men in the labor market.  Thus, protective  legislation  should not be
"prohibiting".
Equal  Pay and Equal Treatment  Legislation
In countries  where wage  discrimination  was overt, the effects  of adopting  equal pay "for  the same or like
work" legislation  have been impressive. In Britain, Australia,  New Zealand, Canada  and Greece female
pay used to be prescribed  in collective  agreements  with reference  to (often as a percentage  of) male pay.
The underpayment  of women was based on two notions.  First, that a man has typically  to support  a
family and should therefore be paid a  "family" wage, that is,  a wage that can support him and his
dependents. Second, that women  are working either for themselves  (as single  women)  or, when married,
their income  was supplementary  to family income. Thus this kind of wage setting  was  a reflection  of the
prevailing  norms.  At the same time, such a way of wage setting suited employers  on the grounds of
22short-run cost-minimization considerations.  When differential pay  rates  for  women and men workers
were outlawed and a single wage rate was adopted, the gender pay gap was reduced in some cases by as
much as one-third.
The success of  equal  pay  legislation should  not  be overrated.  The  impressive effects of equal  pay
legislation  took  place  only  in  counties  where  collective  bargaining  was  widespread  and  wage
discrimination was overt,  that is, on statute.  In this case enforcement took the form of "a stroke of a
pen".  Employers could not avoid its implementation though some adjustment,  unjustified or justified,
took place.  For  example,  in Canada following the equal pay legislation  some employers deliberately
reclassified jobs to avoid applying the principle of equal pay "in the same or like work".  In other cases,
the previously "male" and  "female" wage rates  were replaced by  rates  for  "heavy" and  "light" work
(MacDonald, 1994).
Equal pay policies are harder to administer when there exists segregation in employment and the principle
of the same (or like) employment does not apply.  For example, if there  is an industry wide collective
agreement that specifies the wage rate of,  say,  semi-skilled workers in the car industry, it makes little
difference what these semi-skilled workers do.  However, it will make  a lot of difference if collective
agreements are specific to skilled workers in mechanical aspects of production or in upholstery tasks.  The
former are usually undertaken by men and the latter by women.  In this case gender pay differences will
be driven by segregation in employment rather than unequal pay in the same employment.  In fact, since
overt wage discrimination is often illegal, firms can react to pay policies by diversifying labor demand,
and jobs can become segregated between women and men so that  the principle of comparison cannot
apply.
Comparable worth legislation, unlike the  "equal pay for the same or  like work",  requires that equally
productive workers are paid the same.  Job evaluation schemes can be undertaken to examine whether a
cook is for example "worth" as much as a carpenter.  Though it is true that (from a demand side) the two
types of work may require the same level of training,  effort, responsibility and so on,  it is also possible
that cooks (mostly women)  are in more abundant  supply than carpenters  (mostly men).  Under  these
conditions the labor market will in the first instance assign a lower wage to a cook than to a carpenter.
This  will not be  "fair"  as two comparable workers  in terms of  human  capital characteristics will  be
rewarded differently.  But enforcing equal pay between these two types of work will ignore differences in
preferences (the supply side) and will introduce an inefficiency  both in the form of higher labor costs for
cooks and also in subsequently higher prices.  The evidence in the US shows that there have been adverse
employment effects  following the  adoption of  the  comparable worth  principle  and  there  are  doubts
whether women as a group benefited (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1987).
Affirmative action, in the form of prescribing quotas in employment, can be even more difficult to justify
as its overall effects are difficult to predict.  Quotas may induce an inefficiency, if workers who secure
employment through them are less qualified than  those who would have been selected in the absence of
the policy.  In addition, workers who benefit from the policy may have lower incentives to invest in their
own human capital as long as they can find employment as a consequence  of employers' obligation to
satisfy numerical goals.
23VII. CONCLUSIONS
The paper evaluated the most representative labor market indicators in developing countries during the last
few decades.  It found that in all fronts there has been an improvement and, in fact, the speed at which
labor markets in developing countries change has been much faster than the experience of industrialized
countries would  suggest.  Continuing  improvement  in  women's  labor  market  outcomes  and  further
narrowing of gender differentials  can increase output and the welfare of women and men.
There are obvious definitional and statistical problems that limit generalizations.  Additional research will
be  required whether  improvements could  have been greater  and  whether they  could have  taken place
earlier that they actually did.  Also, additional research would be useful in linking what happened to the
labor market and also in invisible  production.
It  would be  a  truism  to say that economic  growth brings  about  benefits to  all workers  and  women
specifically in the short-run (feminization  due to globalization  has flexibilized  both men and women - to
use three neologisms that appeared in the last decade). However, it seems that women workers benefit at
large from growth: the changes observed  in this paper have  not been small.  It is unlikely that sectoral
policies alone could have effected these changes in the absence of growth though at the margin they can
be useful.
From a labor market perspective, the two most important recommendations of the paper are, first, policies
should treat reproduction and unpaid work as recognized economic activities.  Based on this distinction,
benefits and other social assistance/insurance should be the concern of broad public policies and not just
being  linked to  employers  or enterprises.  When benefits  are  employer financed,  they  can  increase
women's  labor costs while they do  not reach  women in the informal sector who most likely need these
benefits most. The case of economies in transition show that women now face a great risk of poverty as
services that were traditionally borne by enterprises are now lost (such day care, child allowances, family
leave).
And, second, it is important that legislation is timely and not-over-designed.  This is particularly relevant
in the emerging national and international economic conditions as one side effect of opening up the world
markets is the increasing difficulty in enforcing labor legislation, especially in developing countries where
surplus labor  still exists.  Legislation even  in  advanced  countries reaches  successively fewer  women
workers because of increasingly  casual nature of contracts.  The more separated the formal and informal
sectors become as a result of legislation, the more difficult workers find it to switch between these two
sectors.  This is particularly  relevant for  women  in developing  countries who  are still predominantly
employed in the informal sector.
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The  paper  examines  the level  and changes  in female  and male  participation
rates,  employment  segregation  and female  relative  to male  wages  across  the
world economy.  It finds sufficient  evidence  to support  the view that labor
markets  in developing  countries are  transformed  relatively quickly in the
sense  that gender  differentials  in employment  and  pay are  narrowing  much
faster  than  they  did in industrialized  countries.  However,  the  paper  evaluates
the inefficiencies  arising  from persisting  gender differentials in the labor
market  and  finds  them  to be potentially  significant.  The  estimates  also  indicate
that the resulting  deadweight  losses  are borne primarily by women while
men gain mainly in relative terms -there  are no real winners from
discrimination.  The paper  concludes  that growth benefits  women at large,
inequalities  can have  significantly  adverse  effects  on welfare,  and market-
based  development  alone  can  be a weak instrument  for reducing  inequality
between  the  sexes.  To  break  the  vicious  circle of women's  low initial human
capital  endowments  and inferior  labor market  outcomes  compared  to men  s,
the paper proposes  greater  access  of girls to education and of women to
training, enforceable equal pay and equal employment opportunities
legislation,  a taxation and benefits  structure  that treats  reproduction  as  an
economic  activity and wvomen  as  equal partners  within households,  and a
better accounting of women's work to  include  invisible production.
5  ~~HUMAN  DEVELOPMENT  NETWORK  1